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Being no expert in the niceties of constitutional law, my first impulse was
to decline the invitation to take part in this Symposium devoted to decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. On reflection, however, I thought perhaps a
bit more ink might appropriately be expended on the Court’s 1991 decision in
the case of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.1 While probably not the worst
Supreme Court decision of all time—okay, clearly not the worst—the Shute
case was, from my standpoint as a teacher of contract law, a bad decision for
the parties, for the court, and for the future of contract law.
Factually, at least, the case was apparently a simple one. Eulala and Russel
Shute, residents of Washington state, purchased through a Washington travel
agency tickets for a cruise on one of the defendant’s ships.2 The ship set sail
from Los Angeles, California, and returned there when the voyage was over,
having sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, and back.3 While at sea, the Shutes
along with other passengers were treated to a guided tour of the ship’s galley,
in the course of which Mrs. Shute slipped and fell on a wet floor.4 After
returning to their Washington home, the Shutes brought a negligence action
against the defendant cruise line in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, seeking damages for their injuries.5
* Charles L. Knapp is Joseph W. Cotchett Distinguished Professor of Law at University of
California Hastings College of the Law.
1 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Professor Linda S. Mullenix is
also contributing to this Symposium a critique of the Shute case, concentrating on its proce-
dural-law aspects. In this piece, I will confine myself to considering the contract law ramifi-
cations of the decision. Notable contemporary commentaries on Shute include an earlier
article by Professor Mullenix, see Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad
Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323
(1992), and others by Professor Jean Braucher, see Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 61–68 (1995), and Lee Goldman, see Lee Goldman, My Way and the
Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Con-
tracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 707–10 (1992). See also Richard A. Gantner, Contracts—
Forum Selection—Absent Bad Faith, Fraud, or Overreaching, a Reasonable Forum Selec-
tion Clause in a Commercial Cruise Form Contract is Enforceable—Carnival Cruise Lines
v. Shute, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 539 (1992) (Court should have held Carnival’s clause
“patently unreasonable, unenforceable and unconscionable”).
2 See Shute, 499 U.S. at 587–88.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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After several courts had weighed in at various stages of the proceedings,
the Shutes’ matter ended up before the United States Supreme Court.6
Although at earlier stages the issue of jurisdictional due process had figured
importantly in the case, by the time Shute reached the Supreme Court that point
had been settled, and the principal question remaining was the effect of the
following language contained in the Shutes’ tickets for their voyage:
8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and
matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall
be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to
the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.7
If the Court were to hold this forum-selection clause to be valid and
enforceable, the Shutes’ suit could only be prosecuted in a court located in the
state of Florida, across the continent; if not, it could be heard in the state of
Washington. Ultimately, application of the clause depended on whether as a
matter of policy the Court found it appropriate in light of established (or, more
accurately, newly-discovered) choice-of-law principles to allow the Shutes’
access to the defendant to be so restricted by contract. In an opinion written by
Justice Blackmun, the court held that the clause was valid and enforceable, and
not in violation of federal statute.8 A dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens
(joined by Justice Marshall) would have reached a contrary result on both the
general validity of the clause and the question of statutory application.9
In reaching its decision, the Court necessarily had to consider the question
of contract formation—whether there was a valid contract between the Shutes
and the defendant containing the forum-selection clause. That was a question of
contract law—federal contract law, to be sure, since admiralty law generally
governed the case, but contract law nonetheless. Speaking principally from the
contract-law perspective, then, was the Shute case “wrongly decided”? Let us
count the ways.
6 Initially, the case was brought in the Federal District Court of Washington, Western Dis-
trict. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1988 A.M.C. 591 (W.D. Wash. 1987). That court
granted the defendant’s motion for dismissal on grounds that the court lacked personal juris-
diction over the defendant. Id. at 595. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially
reversed, on the basis that the lower court did indeed have jurisdiction over the defendant
and the forum-selection clause was unenforceable. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 863
F.2d 1437, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988). That opinion was subsequently withdrawn, however, and
the case was referred to the Supreme Court of Washington for decision of certified question.
See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 872 F.2d 930, 930 (9th Cir. 1989). The Washington
court held that Washington’s long-arm statute did provide a basis for jurisdiction over the
defendant in Washington state. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 783 P.2d 78, 82 (Wash.
1989) (en banc). The case then returned to the Ninth Circuit, which issued a revised version
of its earlier opinion, holding once again that jurisdiction was present and that the forum-
selection clause was unenforceable. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389
(9th Cir. 1990). Thereafter, certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court and this deci-
sion followed. Shute, 499 U.S. at 589.
7 Shute, 499 U.S. at 587–88 (internal quotations marks omitted).
8 Id. at 587, 596–97.
9 Id. at 597.
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DOES THE DECISION FOLLOW ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT?
This is clearly not an inappropriate question to ask in a legal system that
relies on the principle of stare decisis, but probably less important in the case of
the United States Supreme Court than anywhere else. It’s hard these days to be
anything but “legally realistic” about the fact that the law is what the Supreme
Court says it is on any given day, regardless of what the Court might have said
yesterday, or the day before, or for that matter may say tomorrow.10 And the
Shute decision does indeed follow precedent, in the sense that it enforces the
contractual choice-of-forum clause, just as in 1972 the Court had done in M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.11 In deciding M/S Bremen, however, the
Court broke sharply with established precedent, which had previously disfa-
vored choice-of-law clauses;12 Shute, in that sense, merely followed in M/S
Bremen’s wake. Yet viewed from the contract law perspective, Shute was a
case that cried out for different treatment. M/S Bremen had enforced a forum-
selection clause contained in a contract for the towing of an underwater drilling
rig from Louisiana across the Atlantic to the Italian coast; that contract, made
between two business corporations (one American and one German), provided
for disputes to be resolved in court in London. As the Court noted in M/S
Bremen, that contract was “a far from routine transaction,” and it would be
“unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, includ-
ing fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figur-
ing prominently in their calculations.”13 And indeed the Court in Shute at first
appears to be going to some pains to show that it, too, saw the substantial
difference between the facts of M/S Bremen and those of the case before it:
[The Shutes’] passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly identical to
every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and most other cruise
lines. . . . Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the
terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the
ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.14
But this “common sense” appraisal was immediately walked back, with a
statement that the Court does not “adopt the Court of Appeals’ determination
that a non-negotiated forum-selection clause in a form ticket contract is never
enforceable simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.”15 So it is neither
the reasoning nor the rationale of M/S Bremen that the court in Shute is follow-
ing here; rather M/S Bremen is just a stepping-stone to a now-favored and
much more far-reaching result.
10 The poster case for this proposition is probably Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000),
although perhaps Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), is
a strong contender. And, speaking of Justice Blackmun (he wrote the Shute majority opin-
ion), some might nominate Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972).
12 See id. at 8–9.
13 Id. at 13–14.
14 Shute, 499 U.S. at 593 (citations omitted).
15 Id.
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DOES THE DECISION RECOGNIZE AND CORRECTLY APPLY
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW?
This is a question easier to pose than to answer. As of 1992, “contract
law” in America could be seen as an uneasy amalgam of “traditional” or “class-
ical” contract law, “modern” contract law, and “law and economics” contract
law.16 To the extent that the Court in Shute appears in effect to place upon the
plaintiffs the burden of reading, understanding, and reacting to the terms of the
contract they had made, it imposes on them the “duty to read” that countless
courts have thought appropriate, even necessary, for a system of contract law to
function.17 In this view, anyone who signs (or as in this case “adheres to”) a
document that he or she knows was intended to have legal, contractual conse-
quences is and should be bound by its terms, whether those terms were under-
stood or even read by that person, because to hold otherwise would render the
system of contract law simply unworkable.18 The Court observed in passing
that the Shutes had “conceded that they were given notice of the forum provi-
sion.”19 Because of this, the Court reasoned, they “presumably retained the
option of rejecting the contract with impunity.”20 This brief passage has been
taken by many courts tasked with applying Shute as an open invitation to
16 See generally Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Con-
tract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002); Braucher, supra note 1.
17 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read – Business
Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1966).
18 See generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 342–57 (6th
ed. 2009). The following passage is typical: “Parties to a written contract have the obligation
to read what they sign; and, absent actual or constructive fraud, . . . they are not excused
from the consequences attendant upon a failure to read the contract.” Barnett v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App. 2001). In Finkelschtein v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, the plaintiff had argued that he was a sixty-seven year old Russian e´migre´ who did not
speak or write English, and that he had no knowledge of the defendant’s forum-selection
clause. Finkelschtein v. Carnival Cruise Lines, MON-L-850-05, 2006 WL 1492469, at *1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 2006). However, his wife could speak (and read, appar-
ently) English. Id. at *2. In the lower court, Judge English held that because they both signed
a certification which stated that plaintiff had the provisions of the ticket translated to him,
and both also signed the ticket contract acknowledgment, this “meant that they received,
read and agreed with the terms and conditions of the guest ticket contract.” Id.; see also
Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (legally blind
plaintiff suing under ADA bound by clause where she failed to have someone read the entire
document to her), rev’d on reconsideration, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (clause
not enforced because of plaintiff’s physical disabilities).
19 Shute, 499 U.S. at 595. Presumably that statement is based on this passage in the Shutes’
brief:
Petitioner spends considerable time in its brief discussing whether the forum selection clause was
incorporated in the ticket and that it was reasonably communicated to the respondents. These are
not relevant issues in this case. The respondents do not contest the incorporation of the provi-
sions nor that the forum selection clause was reasonably communicated to the respondents, as
much as three pages of fine print can be communicated. The issue is whether the forum selection
clause should be enforced, not whether Respondents received the ticket.
Brief for the Respondents, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (No. 89-1647),
1990 WL 508102 at *26 (emphasis added). In light of the outcome, one suspects that irony,
however effective it may be in daily life, is lost on the Supreme Court.
20 Shute, 499 U.S. at 595.
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enforce any contract of whose terms the adhering party could be said to have
had “notice” (which in practice appears to mean “having potentially an aware-
ness that the other party maybe had some contract terms that it wanted to apply
to their transaction”), and thus to have had an “option” to reject those terms—
no matter how brief the window of opportunity that existed for the adhering
party actually to read, understand and react to them.21
The quoted passage from Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion also
appears to require that the adhering party have enjoyed in fact an opportunity to
reject and withdraw from the transaction before adverse financial consequences
became unavoidable—“with impunity”—and thus to imply that the Shutes
indeed had such an opportunity. However, Justice Stevens’s dissent pointed out
that the Shutes’ contract of passage contained another provision (equally
unlikely to have been understood, read, or even noticed) that relieved the car-
rier of any responsibility to make a refund for unused tickets.22 This provision
might or might not have been enforceable against the Shutes had they chosen to
cancel their trip,23 but later courts have seized on this point as making it per-
missible to read the majority’s “with impunity” language as demanding little or
nothing in the way of real redress for the passenger who elects not to accept the
offered terms of carriage.24
21 See, e.g., Bowen v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Inc., No. CL0016, 2000 WL 35440459 (Va.
Cir. June 13, 2000) (passengers received tickets ten days before sailing, after the fare had
been paid in full, and prices were non-refundable); Golden v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 780
N.Y.S.2d 701, 703–04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term 2004) (passenger had ticket for two to
three weeks before learning of father’s illness necessitating cancellation). Occasionally a
judge will voice a mild protest:
From the papers, it appears that Carnival’s forum-selection clause is unfair and unreasonable
because of the location of the clause, and the microscopic size of its print. The clause also
appears unreasonable because passengers do not have an opportunity to read the clause until after
they purchase their non-refundable tickets. However, these concerns are the same as those that
were unsuccessfully presented to the Supreme Court in Shute.
Pucillo v. Doe, M.D., No. 013679C, 2002 WL 31492388, at *2 (Mass. Super. Oct. 2, 2002).
22 Shute, 499 U.S. at 597. The provision, paragraph 16(a), is reproduced on page 605 of the
opinion. See id. at 605.
23 Justice Stevens seems to suggest that the provision might not have been enforceable, but
his language is ambiguous:
Of course, many passengers, like the respondents in this case will not have an opportunity to read
paragraph 8 [(the forum-selection clause)] until they have actually purchased their tickets. By
this point, the passengers will already have accepted the condition set forth in paragraph 16(a),
which provides that ‘[t]he Carrier shall not be liable to make any refund to passengers in respect
of . . . tickets wholly or partly not used by a passenger.’ Not knowing whether or not that
provision is legally enforceable, I assume that the average passenger would accept the risk of
having to file suit in Florida in the event of an injury, rather than canceling—without a refund—
a planned vacation at the last minute.
Id. at 597 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). Grammatically the subject of “not
knowing” should probably be “I” (Justice Stevens, that is), but seems more likely to have
been intended by him as “the average passenger.”
24 See, e.g., Bowen, 2000 WL 35440459; Golden, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 703–04. In Norwegian
Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Clark the court considered and enforced a forum-selection clause that
required suit in a particular county in Florida, where plaintiffs had sued in Florida but in a
different county. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Clark, 841 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003). In the course of its opinion, the court had this to say about the decision in Shute:
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It can thus be argued that the majority’s opinion in Shute, although stern
and perhaps even harsh, did not go outside the boundaries of traditional con-
tract law. But long before the Shute decision, courts and commentators had
amply noted the existence in contracting practice of (1) standardized forms,
permitting the creation of multiple versions of what is essentially the same
agreement, with only a few salient terms varied from one transaction to
another,25 and (2) “contracts of adhesion,” in which one party proposes a con-
tract on terms which the other party is invited only to accept without negotia-
tion—a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.26 The contract in Shute was, of course, both
of those things. As Justice Stevens pointed out, commentators were, by 1992,
visibly skeptical that such contracts should be routinely enforced, and by
employing the doctrine of unconscionability (among others), were advocating a
distinct approach to such agreements.27 Although Justice Blackmun’s opinion
does not use the term “contract of adhesion,” it does (in the passage quoted
above) essentially admit that defendant’s contract of carriage does indeed look,
walk, and quack like a contract of adhesion.28 Having reached this point in its
analysis, the Court could have concluded that the transaction was characterized
by what is commonly termed “procedural unconscionability,” and proceeded to
subject the contract to strict scrutiny to see if either its terms in general or the
choice-of-law term in particular could pass the test of substantive conscion-
ability.29 Without using the language of unconscionability analysis, the Court
nevertheless kind of does that anyway: at one point it engaged in an analysis of
The Supreme Court clearly recognized that policy benefits accrued to the cruise lines only when
the policy regarding the forum for litigation was uniform. The Supreme Court was well aware
that passengers like Mrs. Shute would not necessarily be able to obtain a full refund of the ticket
price if they objected to the forum selection clause in the passenger ticket . . . . Weighing the
disadvantages to Mrs. Shute against the advantages to the cruise line industry, the Supreme Court
nonetheless determined as a matter of law that this same type of passenger ticket with this same
type of forum selection clause has public policy benefits, that there are overriding national con-
cerns that mandated enforcement of the contract, and that inconsistent and varying adjudications
within the fifty states would have a detrimental impact on federal law.
Id. at 553. There is certainly some creative mind-reading going on here, but the Florida court
may nevertheless be correct that this is how Shute has come to be perceived, whatever its
actual language. The business convenience of the defendant cruise line and a desire for
conservation of judicial resources, see infra text accompanying notes 32–33, have grown
into “overriding national concerns.”
25 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? – An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704 (1931).
26 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
27 Shute, 499 U.S. at 600. Justice Stevens cites works by Professors Llewellyn, David Slaw-
son, and Todd Rakoff, as well as the opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the leading early unconscio-
nability case. Shute, 499 U.S. at 600. Since Shute was decided, Professor Rakoff’s article has
become the gold standard for present-day discussion of adhesion contracts. Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1983); see also
Knapp, supra note 16, at 770 n.37.
28 See Shute, 499 U.S. at 593.
29 The terms “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability were coined by Professor
Arthur Leff in his leading article and have become standard tools for applying the doctrine.
See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489, 509 (1967). For further discussion of adhesion contracts, see gener-
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the “reasonableness” of the clause,30 and in a separate passage a bit farther on it
subjects the contract to what it terms “judicial scrutiny for fundamental
fairness.”31
Judicial scrutiny is indeed called for, but this is a particularly myopic ver-
sion. Distilling the gist of these passages, the factors the Court deems worth
mentioning could be lined up as follows:
Favoring enforcement:
1. A cruise line has a “special interest” in limiting its exposure to suit,
because cruise ships travel to many different places, and carry passengers from
many locales, and thus could be subject to suit in many jurisdictions.32
2. Choice-of-forum clauses reduce uncertainty about where suits must be
brought and defended, conserving judicial resources.33
3. There has been no showing of “fraud or overreaching” in this case,
and there is clearly no “bad-faith motive” behind the clause, because the defen-
dant’s principal place of business is in Florida.34
4. “[I]t stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing
a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares
reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it
may be sued.”35
Disfavoring enforcement:
1. . . .
I was prepared at this point to make a list of the items on the other side,
but then realized that in this example of “judicial scrutiny” there appear to be
none of those deemed worthy of mention, other than the above reference to the
absence of such factors as “fraud or overreaching.” Forget about strict scrutiny;
this is hardly even a “balancing” test. And among the factors enumerated as
favoring enforcement, note the nearly complete absence of any argument that
such clauses actually benefit the passenger. As a result of this decision, this
cruise line (and all others, for that matter) gets a rule which very clearly
reduces its exposure to future liability—fewer passengers will be able to sue,
fewer suits will result, and fewer still will succeed or be settled on economi-
cally viable terms. For the court to pretend otherwise is to insult the reader’s
intelligence. For their trouble, the justices of this Court (and, more signifi-
cantly, judges in the lower courts as well) get a “conservation of judicial
ally Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of
Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95 (2006).
30 Shute, 499 U.S. at 593–94.
31 Id. at 595.
32 Id. at 593. This seems a bit over-stated, since fundamental rules of due process would
presumably have a narrowing effect on the number of potential jurisdictions where suit could
be brought against a cruise line, or for that matter, any other business with a global
operation.
33 Id. at 593–94. The number of lawsuits dealing with this issue to some extent undercuts
this point. And in any case, plaintiffs deprived of their day in court have little reason to cheer
the “certainty” that has left them stranded.
34 Id. at 595. Of course, the presence of a good faith reason doesn’t preclude the possibility
of a bad faith one as well; limiting a plaintiff to one and only one forum necessarily deprives
her of the ability to sue in any other, and it would be naive to believe this doesn’t figure in
the drafters’ calculations as well.
35 Id. at 594. I return to this point below.
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resources.”36 The only perceived benefit to these or any other passengers
comes in the form of “reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line
enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued”—reduced fares which “it
stands to reason” future passengers will enjoy.37
At this point, we leave contract law—both “classical” and “modern”—
behind, and enter the Looking Glass world of contract-law-and-economics. We
are invited to assume that merely because a firm realizes savings by denying to
those it has wronged appropriate access to a convenient forum for redress of
their injuries, it will pass those savings along to its customers. Apparently we
are expected to imagine a hypothetical Professor Farnsworth, CEO of a global
transportation business, exclaiming to his staff, “Good News, everyone!! We
have successfully avoided a lot of lawsuits, so now we can reduce our
prices!!”38 We could reduce our prices, that is—unless instead we prefer
adding to our retained earnings (thereby increasing the value of our stock). Or
raising executive salaries and bonuses (as a reward for increasing profits by,
e.g., dodging lawsuits). Or paying more to lobbyists to battle those pesky regu-
lations (which otherwise could conceivably help protect future passengers from
injury). Or contributing (legally, of course) to cruise-line-friendly political can-
didates. Or—well, you get the idea. Of course, companies may compete on the
basis of price, temporarily or otherwise, in a fashion which does benefit their
customers. But to assume that in fact this will be the result if we enable a
company to avoid liability for its wrongful actions is to make an unjustified
leap of faith.39 And to assume farther that this necessarily would be a desirable
result if purchased at the expense of reduced compensation to those injured by
36 Id. at 593–94.
37 Id. at 594.
38 Knowledgeable readers will realize that the reference is not to venerated Professor E.
Allan Farnsworth, late of Columbia University School of Law and Reporter for the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, but to Professor Hubert Farnsworth of Comedy Central’s
“Futurama,” the elderly chief executive of Planet Express, an intergalactic delivery service.
See, e.g., Futurama, Raging Bender (20th Century Fox, original broadcast Feb. 27, 2000).
39 For a full analysis of the law-and-economics claims in Shute, see generally Goldman,
supra note 1. Professor Goldman concludes that enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses in
mass consumer contracts “does not merely substitute economics for fairness and equity,” it
also “represents the triumph of economic theory over reality.” Id. at 740. He continues:
[The] premise, that freedom of contract maximizes societal wealth because the parties to a con-
tract know what is best for them, simply is inapposite for secondary terms in consumer contracts.
Consumers do not read or understand the subordinate terms of their contracts and, therefore, do
not, as a group, voluntarily and knowingly adopt the obligations and duties contained therein.
The subordinate terms of the contract are just not a reflection of consumers’ self-interests. To
pretend otherwise is to live in a fantasy land.
. . . [C]onsumers’ failure to read or understand the subordinate terms of their contracts is
rational economic behavior, . . . economic efficiency favors placing the risk of distant litigation
on the seller, and . . . the costs of government intervention in the forum selection clause context
are de minimis. Thus, neither normative judgments about consumers’ responsibility for their
conduct nor enlightened economic reasoning can support the Supreme Court’s prima facie valid-
ity rule for forum selection clauses in consumer contracts.
Id. at 740–41.
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the corporation’s actions is to completely ignore the risk-spreading effect of
modern tort law.40 Which is, presumably, mostly what this is about.41
DOES THE SHUTE DECISION CONTRIBUTE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT LAW?
As one of our presidents might have said, that depends on what the mean-
ing of “contribute” is. Despite its origin as “only” federal admiralty law, the
Shute decision has been touted by many courts and commentators as a prime
exemplar of the so-called “rolling” contract, in which one party is bound not
only to terms of which she—in theory, at least—could have been aware at the
time she initially manifested her general assent to the transaction, but to any
terms the other party sees fit to add either before, during or after what we used
to consider as the process of “contract formation.”42 “Terms-in-the-box” con-
tracts,43 “shrinkwrap” contracts,44 “click-wrap” contracts,45 “scroll-down”
40 By “modern tort law” I refer to the kind of tort law that roughly corresponds to what I
have elsewhere called “modern contract law”—the mid-twentieth-century view that a realis-
tic jurisprudence, attuned to the economic realities of modern life, could contribute to the
general welfare by tempering the extremes of laissez-faire economics. See Charles L. Knapp,
Commentary, An Offer You Can’t Revoke, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 309, 316–19. One example
would be the development of product liability law through the interaction of tort and con-
tract. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 439–40 (Cal. 1944); see
also MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 21–39 (2008).
41 Like the Supreme Court’s aggressive promotion of mandatory arbitration clauses in adhe-
sion contracts, the Court-created “strong presumption” in favor of choice-of-law and choice-
of-forum clauses has the effect—presumably not unintended—of decreasing enterprise lia-
bility, which in turn hampers the risk-spreading effect that the rules of both contract and tort,
as developed over the twentieth century, could provide. For excellent discussions of the role
that contract law can play in these areas, see generally William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding
the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2006);
Jillian R. Camarote, Comment, A Little More Contract Law with My Contract Please: The
Need to Apply Unconscionability Directly to Choice-of-Law Clauses, 39 SETON HALL L.
REV. 605 (2009).
42 The Shute case was decided as a matter of federal admiralty law, and its ruling has been
applied in many similar suits against cruise lines, Carnival and others, in both federal and
state courts. E.g., Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (American
passenger required to litigate in Greece); Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Clark, 841 So.2d
547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (passenger deemed to have notice of contract’s terms when
ticket in possession of travel agent); Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 889 N.E.2d 687
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (cost and inconvenience to Illinois plaintiff might deter her from suing in
Florida, but do not prevent her from doing so); Keikian v. Norwegian Cruise Line, No. 9865,
2004 WL 1293262 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (whether plaintiff “had a sufficient or even
rational reason for not reading the contract” irrelevant; he had an opportunity to do so). It has
also been applied as federal law in diversity cases not involving admiralty. E.g., Sawyer v.
Bill Me Later, Inc., No. CV 10-04461, 2010 WL 5289537 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (credit dispute
with on-line billing service). And it has been expressly adopted by many states as an appro-
priate approach to choice-of-forum clauses. E.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (class action suit against internet provider); Secure US, Inc. v.
Gen. Solutions, Inc., No. 06-C-302, 2006 WL 4633901 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. 2006) (state author-
ity lacking; court will follow federal rule).
43 E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
44 E.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
45 E.g., Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
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terms,46 “terms to-be-added-or-changed-later”47—all of these involve a kind of
“contracting” in which one party not only dictates the terms, it may even retain
the power to change them later, and to do so in ways which the other party is
effectively powerless either to anticipate or to avoid. Both in the world of paper
contracts and in the world where contracts are only “virtual,” contract law is
seemingly moving inexorably toward a state in which neither the presence nor
the absence of actual consent has any real significance. And—not coinciden-
tally—to a world in which, to paraphrase the late Grant Gilmore, “ideally, no
[drafting party] should be liable to anyone for anything.”48
Captain Blackmun and his jolly piratical crew have affixed our blindfolds,
and prodded us out onto the plank. We can only imagine how cold the water is
going to be, and hope that some of us can swim.
46 E.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007). See generally Fran-
cis J. Mootz III, After the Battle of the Forms: Commercial Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 271 (2008).
47 E.g., Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
See generally David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010) (presenting a comprehensive survey of this
area).
48 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974).
